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Abstract
An adaptive control architecture for safe performance of a transport aircraft
subject to various adverse conditions is proposed and verified in this report.
This architecture combines a nominal controller based on a Linear Quadratic
Regulator (LQR) with integral action, and an adaptive controller that ac-
commodates actuator saturation and bounded disturbances. The effectiveness
of the baseline controller and its adaptive augmentation are evaluated and
compared using a stand-alone control verification methodology. Case stud-
ies that pair individual parameter uncertainties with critical flight maneuvers
are studied. The resilience of the controllers is determined by evaluating the
degradation in closed-loop performance resulting from increasingly larger de-
viations in the uncertain parameters. Symmetric and asymmetric actuator
failures, flight upsets, and center of gravity displacements, are some of the
uncertainties considered.
Nomenclature
bre f wingspan
cre f mean aerodynamic chord
CL Aerodynamic force coefficient in the minus z-direction of the wind axes
CD Aerodynamic force coefficient in the minus x-direction of the wind axes
CY Aerodynamic force coefficient in the minus y-direction of the wind axes
Cl Aerodynamic moment coefficient in the x-direction of the body axes
Cm Aerodynamic moment coefficient in the y-direction of the body axes
Cn Aerodynamic moment coefficient in the z-direction of the body axes
Cxy Partial derivative of Cx with respect to y
d	 Design variable
e	 State error
f	 Flight maneuver
F Failure domain
g	 Constraint function
h	 Altitude
Iab Component of the inertia tensor in the ab direction
L	 Aerodynamic torque in the in the x-direction of the body axes
M Aerodynamic torque in the in the y-direction of the body axes
M Maximal set
N Aerodynamic torque in the in the z-direction of the body axes
p
	
Uncertain parameter
p¯
	
Nominal parameter point
p˜
	
Critical parameter value
un Baseline control
1
ua Adaptive control
Uo Control value for trim
u
	 Component of the velocity relative to the air in the x-direction of the body axes
v
	 Component of the velocity relative to the air in the y-direction of the body axes
w
	 Component of the velocity relative to the air in the z-direction of the body axes
W Vehicle’s weight
x
	 state vector of the plant
xm state vector of the reference model
X Aerodynamic force in the in the x-direction of the body axes
Y	 Aerodynamic force in the in the y-direction of the body axes
Z	 Aerodynamic force in the in the z-direction of the body axes
α˜
	 Critical similitude ratio
Δx CG position in the x-direction of the body axes relative to a reference point
Δy CG position in the y-direction of the body axes relative to a reference point
Δz CG position in the z-direction of the body axes relative to a reference point
Λ 	 Control effectiveness matrix
P	 Parametric safety margin
Acronyms
CG Center of gravity
CPV Critical parameter Value
CSR Critical Similitude Ratio
DOF Degrees of fredom
FC Flight Condition
GTM Generic Transport Model
LQR Linear Quadratic Regulator
MS Maximal Set
PSM Parametric Safety Margin
1 Introduction
The challenge of achieving safe flight comes into sharp focus in the face of
adverse conditions caused by faults, damage, or upsets. When these situations
occur, the corresponding uncertainties directly affect the safe operation of the
aircraft. A technology that has the potential for enabling safe flight under
these adverse conditions is adaptive control. One of the main features of an
adaptive control architecture is its ability to react to changing characteristics
of the underlying aircraft dynamics. This paper proposes the building blocks
of an adaptive and reconfigurable control technology that ensures safe flight
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under adverse flight conditions. This technology enables synthesis of such
controllers as well as systematic evaluation of their robustness characteristics.
The field of adaptive control is a mature theoretical discipline that has
evolved over the past fifty years, embodying methodologies for controlling un-
certain dynamic systems with parametric uncertainties [1]- [2]. Through the
efforts of various researchers over this period, systematic methods for the con-
trol of linear and nonlinear dynamic systems with parametric and dynamic
uncertainties have been developed [3]- [4]. Stability and robustness properties
of these systems in the presence of disturbances, time-varying parameters, un-
modeled dynamics, time-delays, and various nonlinearities, have been outlined
in the references [1]- [5] as well as in several journal and conference papers over
the same period.
In this paper, we consider the control of a transport aircraft model that
resembles the Generic Transport Model [6]. While the vehicle’s geometry and
aerodynamic model are those of a C5 aircraft [9], every other aspect has been
made similar to the GTM, e.g. anti wind-up logic, time-delay due to teleme-
try, baseline control structure, low-pass and wash-out filters. We delineate
the underlying nonlinear model of this aircraft, and introduce various types
of damages, and failures into this model. An adaptive control architecture
is proposed which combines a nominal controller that provides a satisfactory
performance in the absence of adverse conditions, and an adaptive controller
that is capable of accommodating various adverse conditions including actua-
tor saturation. The specific adverse conditions considered can be grouped into
the following three categories, (a) upsets, (b) damages, and (c) actuator fail-
ures. Specific cases in (a) include flight upsets in initial conditions of various
states including angle of attack, cases in (b) include situations where struc-
tural failures cause changes in the location of the Center-of-Gravity (CG) [7],
while cases in (c) include situations where symmetric and asymmetric failures
in control surfaces and engines occur. These failures include loss in control
effectiveness, and locked-in-place control surfaces.
The resilience of the adaptive controller to uncertainty is evaluated for
safety using the control verification methodology proposed in [8] . This method-
ology enables the determination of ranges of uncertainty for which a prescribed
set of closed-loop requirements are satisfied. This paper studies several one-
dimensional uncertainty analyses for two flight maneuvers that focus on the
longitudinal and lateral dynamics. As compared to the baseline controller, the
adaptive controller enlarges the region of safe operation by a sizable margin
in all but one of the cases considered.
3
2 The GTM-Like Aircraft
In this section, we begin with a description of a nonlinear dynamic model of
C5, a large transport aircraft whose aerodynamics data is available in [9]. We
consider rigid body dynamics, aerodynamics, effect of the control inputs, and
derive the overall nonlinear flight model. We then discuss adverse conditions
such as flight upsets, damage, and failures, and how to model them.
2.1 Nonlinear Dynamic Model
A typical dynamic model of an aircraft consists of the equations of motion,
aerodynamics, actuator dynamics, actuator saturation, and sensor dynamics.
The standard conservation equations [10] describe the dynamics of u, v, and
w, the body-fixed aircraft velocities; p, q, and r, the roll, pitch, and yaw rates;
and the Euler angles φ, θ, and ψ. The aircraft’s flat-Earth equations of motion
are given by
iu= gX — g sin θ — qw + rv,	 (1)
Y
v˙
 = gW + g cos θ sin φ — ru + pw,	 (2)
w˙
 = gW + g cos θ cos φ + qu — pv,	 (3)
p˙
 
= ID 
[L
 + Ixzpq —
 
(Izz — Iyy) qr] + ID [N — Ixzqr — (Iyy — Ixx) pq] , (4)
1
q˙ = 
I 
[
M — (Ixx — Izz ) pr — Ixz V — r2)^ , (5)
yy
r˙
 = ID 
[L
 + Ixzpq —
 
(Izz — Iyy) qr] + 
ID 
[N — Ixzqr — (Iyy — Ixx) pq] , (6)
φ˙ = p + q sin φ tan θ + r cos φ tan θ,
	 (7)
θ˙
 = q cos φ — r sin φ,	 (8)
ψ˙ = (q sin φ + r cos φ) sec θ,	 (9)
In the above, ID = IxxIzz — I2xz; X, Y , and Z are the aerodynamic forces
in body axes at the actual center of gravity (CG), and L, M, and N are the
aerodynamic moments about the same point. See the Nomenclature section
and Table 1 for the meaning of other symbols. The values of the gross aircraft
weight W, the moments of inertia Ixx, Iyy, and Izz, as well as the product of
inertia Ixz can be found in [9] .
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The following navigation equations determine x and y, the positions of the
aircraft in the north and east directions respectively, as well as the altitude h:
x˙
 = u cos θ cos ψ + v (— cos φ sin ψ + sin φ sin θ cos ψ)+	 (10)
w (sin φ sin ψ + cos φ sin θ cos ψ),
y˙
 = u cos θ sin ψ + v (cos φ cos ψ + sin φ sin θ sin ψ)+	 (11)
w (— sin φ cos ψ + cos φ sin θ sin ψ),
h˙
 = u sin θ — v sin φ cos θ — w cos φ cos θ. (12)
It is often convenient to replace the body-fixed velocities with the true airspeed
VT , the angle-of-attack a, and the side-slip angle β. These new states can be
calculated from the body-fixed velocities, neglecting wind and gust-induced
effects, as
VT = u2 + v2 + w2 ,	 (13)
w
tan a = ,	 (14)
u
sin β= v .	 (15)
VT
It is well known [11] that the aerodynamic forces and moments acting on
the aircraft can be expressed in terms of the non-dimensional force and moment
coefficients through multiplication by a dimensional factor and, in the case of
the forces, a transformation from wind to body axes. The forces and moments
are therefore given by
⎡ ⎤
X cos a 0 — sin a 
—CD cos β
⎣
Y⎦ = g¯S 0 1	 0
	
CY	 (16)
Z	 sin a 0 cos a	 —CL
⎡ ⎤ 	 ⎡ 	 ⎤
(17)
L	 bref
 
Cl
M = gS cre fCm
N	 brefCn
where CL , CD , and CY are the lift, drag, and side-force coefficients respectively
while Cl , Cm , and Cn are the moment coefficients. The values of the wingspan
bre f, the mean aerodynamic chord cre f, and the wing surface area S can be
found in [9] .
Table 1 shows the aircraft states, plant (i.e., inputs to the plant), control
(i.e., outputs of the controller), and pilot inputs. The system state vector
given by
x = [VT a β p g r φ θ ψ x y h] T .	 (18)
The pilot inputs are commands to ailerons, rudders, and elevators. The plant
inputs are the 4 engine throttles and the deflections of 6 control surfaces (i.e.,
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Table 1. Aircraft states, actuators, and pilot inputs.
Variable Description Component of
Vt Velocity State (x)
α Angle of Attack State (x)
β Side-slip Angle State (x)
φ Euler Angle State (x)
B Euler Angle State (x)
ψ Euler Angle State (x)
p Roll Rate State (x)
q Pitch Rate State (x)
r Yaw Rate State (x)
t1 Left outboard Throttle Plant input
t2 Left Inboard Throttle Plant input
t3 Right Inboard Throttle Plant input
t4 Right outboard Throttle Plant input
e1 Left Elevator Plant input, Control output (u)
e2 Right Elevator Plant input, Control output (u)
a1 Left Aileron Plant input, Control output (u)
a2 Right Aileron Plant input, Control output (u)
r1 Lower Rudder Plant input, Control output (u)
r2 Upper Rudder Plant input, Control output (u)
δe,cmd Virtual Elevator Pilot input (r)
δa,cmd Virtual Aileron Pilot input (r)
δr,cmd Virtual Rudder Pilot input (r)
two for elevators, ailerons and rudders). As in the current version of the CTM
the engines are not used for control and the throttle values will be fixed at
their trim values.
The inputs available to the pilot are the elevator, aileron, and rudder com-
mands denoted as ΔSe,cmd, ΔSa,cmd, and ΔSr,cmd. The aerodynamic force and
moment coefficients are given by
CL = CL« α + CLδe Se ,
	
CD = CD« α + CDδe Se ,	 (19)
CY = CYa 0 + CY'p 2VTf + CYr r 2VTf + 
CYa0 2VTf + 
CYaa Sa + CYar Sr ,
Cl = Cla0 + Cl'p 2VTf + 
Clr
r 2VTf + Cla 0 2VTf + Cl
 
'5a Sa + Clar Sr ,
	
crefCm = Cm« α + Cmy q 2V
 
+Cm«
α2V 
+ Cm
a
e Se ,
	
(20)
T	 T
	
bref	 brefCn = Cna0 + Cn'p 2V
 
+ Cnrr 2V 
+ Cn
 
0 2V 
+ Cnaa Sa + Cnar Sr ,
	
T	 T	 R	 T
where
e1 + e2
Se =	 2 ,
Sa
a1 — a2
	)= 2 	 (21
r1 + r2
Sr =	 2 ,
where these symbols are specified in Table 1. These set of equations prescribe
the non-dimensional coefficients in Equations (16) and (17) as a a function
of the state. In the context of this paper, the control surface deflections are
related to the control inputs by u1 = e1 , u2 = e2 , ug = a1 , u4 = a2 , u5 = r1 ,
and u6 = r2 . Overall, the aircraft dynamics is given by the equations above
along with an aerodynamic model. Such a model The model to be used herein
is prescribed subsequently.
We can compactly describe the overall nonlinear model as
X˙ = F (X, ΛU)
	
(22)
where the input U consists of uz , for i = 1, . . 6, and Λ is the control effectiveness
matrix.
For control purposes, the nonlinear plant is linearized about a trim point
(X0 , U0) satisfying F(X0 , U0) = 0. This leads to the linear time invariant
system
x˙p = Apxp + Bpu + g (xp , u)	 (23)
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where
Ap
 
= 
∂F(X, U) 	
BP = ∂F(X, U)
	
(24)
∂X	 ∂U
X0 , U0	X0, 0
and g (xp , u) represents higher order terms.
2.2 Adverse Conditions
We now describe the three categories of upsets, damage, and failures that we
shall introduce in the above model.
Flight upsets: These adverse conditions result from large deviations in the
initial conditions of the state from the trim point at which the plant is derived.
In this paper, such deviations will be called flight upsets regardless of their
size. If a linear system is input-output stable, guarantees for a bounded state
are automatically obtained. In practical situations the closed-loop system is
subject to unknown bounded disturbances, case in which only uniform ultimate
boundedness for linear plants has been proved. This implies that there are
initial conditions for which the state may grow unbounded. Whether the
actual responses are bounded and actually stay within acceptable limits needs
to be demonstrated. In this paper, the initial condition of α will be considered
uncertain. Since the baseline controller designed for the GTM does not enable
lateral command following, flight upsets in β (0) are omitted.
CG movement: A serious condition that needs to be addressed is structural
damage. This causes, among other things, a movement of the CG from its
nominal position. Changes to the moments in Equation (17) in a post-failure
state are given by
ΔL
⎡ 	 ⎤
Δx
⎡ 	 ⎤
cos α 	 0	 — sin α —CD cos β
⎣
ΔM⎦ = Δy x q¯S 0
	
1	 0 CY (25)
ΔN Δz
⎣ ⎦
sin α
	
0
	
cos α
⎦
—CL
where [Δx, Δy, Δz] is the position vector of the actual CG location from the
reference point in body axes. The contribution of the tangential component
of the acceleration can be accounted for by using the inertia tensor about the
actual CG, which is related to the nominal CG by
⎡ 	 ⎤
Δy2 + Δz2
 ΔxΔy	 ΔxΔz
ICG = Inominal — m ⎣ ΔxΔy Δx2 + Δz2 ΔyΔz ⎦ (26)
ΔxΔz
	
ΔyΔz
 Δx2 + Δy2
In the studies that follow the contribution of the centripetal component of the
acceleration resulting from CG movement is ignored. The reader can refer
to [7] for an explicit formulation of the equations of motion.
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Actuator Failures: We now consider adverse conditions that result from
loss of control effectiveness and time delay.
As in reference [12], we model these failures by pre-multiplying the Bp
matrix of the linearized model by the control effectiveness matrix Λ. That
is, the Bp matrix in (23) is changed to BpΛ where Λ is a matrix of dimension
6 x 6, which is equal to the identity matrix in the nominal case. Loss of control
effectiveness is modeled by making the terms in the diagonal of Λ less than
one. For example, if the right elevator fails by 50%, and the left aileron fails
by 40%, Λ takes on the form
Λ = diag [1, 0 . 5 , 0 . 6, 1, 1, 1] .
In general, the control effectiveness matrix takes the form
Λ = diag [Ae,, Ae2, Aa,, Aa2, Ar,, Ar2] ,	 (27)
where 0 < max{Λ} < 1.
In addition to these actuator failures we will also consider time delay in all
six control inputs and control surface lock-ups. In the latter type of failure, the
duration of the lock-in-place failure will be consider an uncertain parameter.
Note that from all uncertainties mentioned above, only those in Λ affect the
value of the control U0 at trim.
3 Adaptive Control Architecture
The proposed control architecture augments a nominal controller with an adap-
tive component. While the nominal controller is designed to meet the perfor-
mance requirements under ideal operating conditions, the adaptive one copes
with failures and uncertainties. The very same structure of the controller that
was designed at Langley Research Center for the GTM will be used in the
nominal controller. Details on such a structure are presented next.
3.1 Nominal Controller
The nominal controller has three main components, an array of low-pass and
wash-out and filters, an LQR controller with integral action, and a hard-limiter
to cope with control saturation. This limiter enforces an anti-integration wind-
up logic based on the elevator deflection. This logic makes the system non-
linear and time varying. Each of these components is described in more detail
next.
3.1.1 Washout Filters and Low-pass Filters
The GTM model has an array of low-pass and wash-out and filters to mitigate
measurement noise and improve handling qualities. A block diagram of the
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system is shown in Figure 1. In particular, the states a, p, q, and r will be
low-pass filtered but only p, q, and r will be washed-out. These filters will be
taken into account when designing the nominal controller.
j ^	 plea of model'
Nominal	 I^Ir,I +'	 ` ^'	 , ^^
,controller'
(Saturstl'on'
Y;«1
	
^T
^,Wa kout!	 1'ow-passl
;filters'	 ;filters'
Figure 1. Washout filters and low-pass filters
3.1.2 LQR Controller with Integral Action
For control design purposes, we assume that the pitch, yaw and roll dynamics
are weakly coupled. In order to closely follow a command in angle of attack,
an integral state eα is added
eα = f (a − acmd ) dt	 (28)
where acmd = 10Se,cmd for 0 ≤ Se,cmd ≤ 1. Note that elevator command does
not affect elevator angle, instead it generates integral error. The signal Se,cmd
is one of the plant inputs in Scmd = [Se,cmd , Sa,cmd , Sr,cmd
^
 T . The augmented
plant dynamics is therefore described as
[ 
e˙α
]
=
[ ] [ ]
+ p]
[
u +
0 ][
acmd
	
(29)H 0 eα 0 1|{z} | {z } |{z} | {z }	 | {z }
x˙ A x B1 	 2
Since the states in Equation (29) are accessible, an LQR controller is designed
as
⎡ ⎤
q
a[
Kδeα Kδeq Kδee
eα
ff	
(30)
ll	 f
LSa,n J — LKδrp Kδ
J [ + [ S
r,cmd]| {z }
Krδcmd
where the control gains Kδ minimize the cost function
J = f (xT Rxxx + uT Ruuu) dt,	 (31)
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and Rxx, R,.,. are weighting matrices. As in the Langley controller, the gains
Kδ, and Kδr' of the stability augmentation system in (30) are set to zero to
eliminate coupling between the lateral and directional dynamics. When only
the baseline controller is used u = u,,, = [6e,,, , 6a,,, , 6r,,,] and that e1 = e2 =
6e,,, /2, a1 = —a2 = 6a,,, /2 and r1 = r2 = 6r,,, /2. Equations (28)-(30) describe
the 6 DOF closed-loop dynamics of an LTI approximation of the GTM for an
LQR controller with integral action.
3.2 Saturation
To ensure that the control input does not exceed the saturation limits for the
three control surfaces, the rectangular saturation function
	
R3 (ui) = ui 	 if Iui I < ui,max,	 (32)
ui,max sign(ui) if Iui I > ui,max,
is used. The control deficiency caused by saturation is given by
uA = u — R3 (u).	 (33)
Besides this physical saturation constraint, an anti-windup logic that de-
pends on eα is also implemented. This logic is governed by the time-varying
saturation function
	
Re (eα , 6e (t)) = eα 	 if e˙α > 0 or eα < eavailable,	 (34)
eavailable if e˙α < 0 and eα
 > eavailable
where eavailable is given by
R3 (6e ) — (6e,trim + Kδea α + Kδe9 qw ) l	 (eavailable = max ^ 0,	 } .	 35)K&e 	 JJJ
The error deficiency caused by the saturation function in Equation (34) is
defined as
eα,A = eα — Re (eα , 6e (t)).
	 (36)
By replacing u with R3 (u,,,), and eα with Re (eα , 6e (t)) in Equation (29) we
obtain the linear time varying system
[
e˙α
] = [Ap — Bp Kx' 	—BpO dea l real +
[
Bp] Kr6cmdJ	 L	 J 0|{z} | {z } |{z} | {z }
x˙ AM x B1
r	 l 11
01
+r	 ] αcmd — [0
p
] uA —
[
—Bp Kδea
]
0 eα,A,	 (37)| {z } | {z } |	 {z }
B2 R 1 R2
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which is the closed-loop system corresponding to the nominal controller. The
boundedness of this system can be established for all initial conditions inside
a bounded set. This set extends to the entire state-space when the open-loop
plant is stable and there is no unmodeled dynamics, e.g., no time-delay.
3.3 Adaptive Controller
Since the nominal controller in (30) has been designed for a plant-model under
nominal conditions, it may prove to be inadequate in the face of failures and
uncertainties. To compensate for this we augment the controller in (30) with
an adaptive component as follows:
	
u = U0 + un + ua = U0 +(K + 0x )x +(Kr + 0r )r + fˆ	(38)
where K and Kr are the feedback and feedforward gains of the baseline con-
troller, while 0x , 0r , and fˆ are adaptively adjusted to minimize the state error
between the controlled plant-model and a reference model. fˆ is chosen to
generate the desired plant output for the commanded input. In the current
problem, the reference model is prescribed by the non-linear closed-loop sys-
tem corresponding to the baseline controller for the case where there are no
uncertainties. None of the saturation functions above are included in the ref-
erence model. Figure 2 shows the block diagram of this control architecture.
Adaptive controllers for the GTM using a reference model that accounts for
;^
i	 Nominal	 1Z^ir:V -_
	
1ZIi	 +i.^	 -,	 _	 '
r:ai
	 F'	 A,
	
'iCbntroller'	 ^	 A	 _	
X
	
.^,	 tt,	 mel,Del'a	 Saturation, Actuator'^	 A'd'aptive	 ”- 1 ,aV	 Ti	 Y	 Failure] ^	
l'disturbance'Controller'	 Uncertainty'	 ,
Washout;	 lowipass,
filters'	 filters'
Figure 2. Control Architecture.
the time delay in telemetry have shown promise. Such controllers, however,
will be presented in future publications.
Let the reference model be prescribed by x˙m = f (xm , u), where xm is the
reference model state. Linearization of this model about ( Xo, Uo) leads to
˙xml = Amxml + Bmu + g (xml , u) .
	 (39)
Defining the state error e as
e = x — xm
	 (40)
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we choose the adaptive laws [1] for adjusting the adaptive parameters in (38)
as
θ˙x = —Γ1BTPeuXT — U1θx
θ˙r
 
= —Γ2BT Peur — U2θr
˙
	 (41)
f = —Γ3BTPeu —U3θf
λˆ˙ = —Γ4diag(uo )BTp Peu — U4 ˆλ
where ATmP + PAm = —Q, Q > 0, Γi is diagonal and positive definite for
i = 1,.. .4, and eu = e — eo . The auxiliary error eo is defined as
e˙o = Ameo — R1diag( ˆλ)uo .	 (42)
Note that if the control does not saturate uo = 0, eo —* 0 and eu —* e. eo
is the error that occurs due to saturation, and by subtracting it out from e,
we obtain eu which is the sum of the error due to uncertainties and the error
due to ea,o. The U modifications prevent the drift of the adaptive parameters
θx , θr , fˆ and λˆ caused by disturbances. The term fˆ is an adaptive parameter
aimed at counteracting constant disturbances.
It should be noted that the stability and boundedness of the closed-loop
augmented system has been proved in [3,13,14] when physical saturation con-
straints are present. However, the stability analysis for the anti-windup logic
in Equation (34) remains to be established.
4 Control Verification
This section introduces a framework for evaluating the degradation in closed-
loop performance caused by increasingly larger values of uncertainty. This
is attained by determining the largest hyper-rectangular set in the uncertain
parameter space for which a set of closed-loop requirements are satisfied by all
set members. A brief introduction to the mathematical framework required
to perform this study is presented next. References [8] and [15] cover this
material in more detail.
4.1 Mathematical Framework
The parameters which specify the closed-loop system are grouped into two
categories: uncertain parameters, which are denoted by the vector p, and the
control design parameters, which are denoted by the vector d. While the plant
model depends on p (e.g., aerodynamic coefficients, initial conditions, time
delay, actuator failures), the controller depends on d (e.g., control gains). The
Nominal Parameter value, denoted as p¯, is the value that p assumes when
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there is no failure/uncertainty. The value of d on the other hand is assumed
to be available and will remain fixed.
Stability and performance requirements for the closed-loop system will be
prescribed by the set of constraint functions, g (p, d) < 0. This vector inequal-
ity, and all others that follow, hold component wise. For a fixed d, the larger
the region in p-space where g < 0, the more robust the controller. The Failure
Domain corresponding to the controller with parameters d is given by 1
dim(g)
.F(d) 
_ 
U .Fj (d).	 (43)
j=1
.Fj (d) _ {p : gj (p, d) > 0},	 (44)
While Equation (44) describes the failure domain corresponding to the jth
requirement, Equation (43) describes the failure domain for all requirements.
The Non-Failure Domain is the complement set of the failure domain and will
be denoted2
 as C (.F). The names “failure domain” and “non-failure domain”
are used because in the failure domain at least one constraint is violated while,
in the non-failure domain, all constraints are satisfied.
Let Q be a set in p-space, called the Reference Set, whose geometric center
is the nominal parameter p¯. The geometry of Q will be prescribed according
to the relative levels of uncertainty in p. One possible choice for the reference
set is the hyper-rectangle
R(p¯, n) _ {p : p¯  — n < p < p¯
 
+ n} .	 (45)
where n > 0 is the vector of half-lengths. One of the tasks of interest is to
assign a measure of robustness to a controller based on measuring how much
the reference set can be deformed before intersecting the failure domain. The
Homothetic Deformation of Q with respect to the nominal parameter point p¯
by a factor of a > 0, is the set H (Q, a) _ { ¯p + a (p — p¯) : p E Q} . The factor
of this deformation, a, is called the Similitude Ratio. While expansions are
accomplished when a > 1, contractions result when 0 < a < 1. Hereafter,
deformations must be interpreted as homothetic expansions or contractions.
In what follows we assume that the controller d satisfies the requirements
for the nominal plant, i.e., g (p¯, d) < 0. Intuitively, one imagines that a ho-
mothet of the reference set is being deformed until its boundary touches the
failure domain. Any point where the deforming set touches the failure domain
is a Critical Parameter Value (CPV). The CPV, which will be denoted as p˜ ,
might not be unique. The deformed set is called the Maximal Set (MS) and
1Throughout this paper, super-indices are used to denote a particular vector or set while
sub-indices refer to vector components, e.g., p ji is the ith component of the vector pj.
2 The complement set operator will be denoted as C(·).
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will be denoted as M. The MS is the largest homothet of Q that fits within
C(F). The Critical Similitude Ratio (CSR), denoted as α˜, is the similitude
ratio of that deformation. While the CSR is a non-dimensional number, the
Parametric Safety Margin (PSM), denoted as ρ and defined later, is its dimen-
sional equivalent. Both the CSR and the PSM quantify the size of the MS.
Details on the implementation of these ideas are presented next.
The CPV corresponding to the deformation of Q = 7Z(p¯, n) for the jth
requirement is given by
p˜j = argmin { IIp — p¯II
—n  : gj (p, d) > 0, Ap > b} ,	 (46)
p
where IIx II—n = supi{|xi |/ni } is the n-scaled infinity norm. The last constraint
in Equation (46) is used to exclude regions of the parameter space where plants
are infeasible and uncertainty levels are unrealistic. The overall CPV is
p˜
 = p˜
k
,
	 (47)
where
k = argmin { IIpj
 — p Iono } .	 (48)
1<j<dim(g)
The critical requirement, which is the one preventing a larger deformation, is
gk < 0. Once the CPV has been found, the MS is uniquely determined by
M (d) = 7Z(p¯, α˜n) .	 (49)
where α˜ = II ˜p — p¯II—n . The Rectangular PSM is defined as
ρ = α˜ IInII,	 (50)
The last two equations, which apply to the overall CPV, can be extended to
individual CPVs, by using p˜j instead of p˜. Note that overall PSM is equal to
the smallest individual PSM.
Because the CSR and the PSM measure the size of the MS, their values are
proportional to the degree of robustness of the controller associated with d to
uncertainty in p. The CSR is non-dimensional, but depends on both the shape
and the size of the reference set. The PSM has the same units as the uncertain
parameters, and depends on the shape, but not the size, of the reference set.
If the PSM is zero, the controller’s robustness is practically nil since there are
infinitely small perturbations of p¯
 
leading to the violation of at least one of
the requirements. If the PSM is positive, the requirements are satisfied for
parameter points in the vicinity of the nominal parameter point. The larger
the PSM, the larger the Q-shaped vicinity.
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4.1.1 One-dimensional Case
In the case where dim {p} = 1, the expressions for the CPVs, the PSM, and
the MS are given by
	
p˜j= argmin { |p — p¯| : gj (p, d) > 0,
	
Ap > b} ,
	 (51)
p
p˜
 = p˜
k
,
	 (52)
ρ = |p˜k — p¯|,	 (53)
	
M (d) = (p¯
 — 
ρ, p¯
 + ρ),
	 (54)
where
	
k = argmin l|p˜j — p¯|} .	 (55)
1<j<dim(g)
Figure 3 shows an sketch with relevant variables and sets. Note that the
non-failure domain is given by the intersection of the individual non-failure
domains. Besides, the overall CPV is the parameter value closest to the nom-
inal point where at least one component of g is equal to zero. From the figure
we see that p˜1 — p¯  < p¯  — p˜2 so p˜ = p˜ 1 and k = 1. By construction, all the
points within the MS, which is centered about the nominal parameter point,
satisfy the closed-loop requirements.
Figure 3. Relevant variables in a 1-dimensional p-space for a fixed d.
As expected, analyses arising from considering each uncertain parameter
individually are unable to capture the effect of the dependencies among un-
certain parameters. When such dependencies are important, the collection
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of PSMs that result from performing dim(p) one-dimensional deformations
can misrepresent the actual system’s robustness. For instance, if ρ1 is the
PSM corresponding to a one-dimensional deformation in p 1 , ρ2 is the PSM
corresponding to a one-dimensional deformation in p2 , and ρ3
 
is the PSM cor-
responding to a two-dimensional deformation in [p 1 ,p2]; it is possible to have
ρ3
 « min{ρ1 , ρ2l. In such a case there is a combination of uncertain parame-
ters much closer to p¯
 
that will be missed by both one-dimensional searches.
4.2 Analysis Setup
4.2.1 Uncertain Parameters
We will consider the following set of uncertain parameters
[Aele, Aail, Arud, Athr, T, tl , Dx , Dy , Da (0)] ,	 (56)
where the first 6 components, can be categorized as actuator uncertainties or
failures, the next two account for structural failures and last one for a flight
upset. In particular,
Aele = [Ae1, Ae2 1
Aail = [Aa1, Aa2]	 (57)
Arud = [Ar1, Ar2]
Athr = [At1, At2, At3, At4]
are the control effectiveness of elevators, ailerons, rudders, and engine throttle;
T is a time delay in all input channels, and tl is the duration of a control surface
lock-up. The terms Dx and Dy are components of the position vector in the xy
-body frame of the post-failure CG location with respect to a reference point.
The last component, which models a flight upset, is the initial condition in
angle of attack. The nominal parameter values corresponding to the set of
parameters in Equation (56) is [1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0].
4.2.2 Closed-loop Requirements
The following stability and performance requirements will be considered
g0
 
= max{ [utrim — umax, umin — utrim] l,
	 (58)
g1 = max 
I VT
 I — 2 . 5,	 (59)
t	 g
g2
 
= [(a — acmd ) 2 + kαa˙2 + (β
 — 
βcmd )2
 + kββ˙2
i
t=t f — 
c1 ,
	 (60)
17
g3 = 71 (p, d) — c271(¯p, dbase ) ,	 (61)71 
= w1 I Ia — acmd II2
 
+ w2 I Ip — pcmd II2 + w3 I Ir — rcmd I I2
where 11 - 12 is the L2 norm in the interval [0, t f] . The first requirement, g0 < 0,
is used to determine if the vehicle has enough control authority to trim, i.e.
if it satisfies umin < utrim < umax. Note that this requirement is independent
of d and may indicate instability. g1 < 0 is a structural requirement enforced
by preventing the loading factor from exceeding the upper limit of 2 . 5. The
requirement g2 < 0, where 0 < c1 « 1, kα > 0 and kβ > 0, enforces stability
and satisfactory steady state performance. The last requirement, g3 < 0, for
c2 > 1, w1 > 0, w2 > 0 and w3 > 0, is used to measure satisfactory transient
performance. This requirement prevents the cumulative error from exceeding
a prescribed upper limit. Such a limit is c2 times larger than the cumulative
error incurred by the baseline controller under nominal flying conditions.
In practice, control requirements are prescribed in advance before the con-
trol design process even starts. When such requirements are only described
qualitatively several implementations of the constraints g are possible. This
creates the additional challenge of constructing functional forms that capture
well the intent of the requirement while having a minimal amount of conser-
vatism. This paper does not tackle such a challenge and assumes that the g
above is given.
4.3 Flight Conditions (FC)
The closed-loop response depends on p and d as well as on the intended flight
maneuver, denoted hereafter as f. This implies that g (p, d, f). Two flight
conditions, namely flon and flat, will be consider in the analyses that follow.
In the former one, which mostly affects the longitudinal dynamics, a step input
in Secmd is commanded. In the second one, which affects both the longitudinal
and lateral dynamics, the vehicle also starts from level flight and a set of
commands in Sacmd and Srcmd make the vehicle turn. Figures 4 and 5 show
the vehicle’s trajectory and relevant states for the longitudinal flight condition
when there is no uncertainty/failure. The same information corresponding
to the lateral flight condition is shown in Figures 6 and 7. The p command
for flat is a sequence of two step inputs (only one is shown) where the second
one cancels the first one after a suitable time.
5 Results
In this section, we evaluate the baseline controller in Equation (37) and the
adaptive controller in Equations (38)- (42) according to the control verification
setting of Section 4. The aerodynamic model used can be found in [9] . The
numerical values of other variables are shown in Table 3.
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Table 2. Cases analyzed
Case Failure/Uncertainty
Case A Flight upset in angle of attack [Δα(0) flon]
Case B CG movement along x-axis [Δx flon]
Case C CG movement along y-axis [Δy flat]
Case D Symmetric Aileron failure [Λail flat]
Case E Symmetric Elevator failure [Λele flon]
Case F Asymmetric Aileron failure [Aa1 flat]
Case G Asymmetric Throttle failure [At1 flon]
Case H Elevator lock-in-place failure [tl flon]
Case I Time delay in all control inputs [T flon]
Variable Value
Velocity at trim 614(ft/sec)
Angle of Attack at trim 2.2 (deg)
Height at trim 20000(ft)
K jeα —0.4420
K jeq —0.9105
K jee —0.7906
K jap —0.1000
Ka,, —0.3000
17 1 diag([1, 1, 100, 100, 100, 100]) x 200
172 diag( [1, 1, 100, 100, 100, 100]) x 100
173 diag( [1, 1, 100, 100, 100, 100]) x 50
174 diag( [1,1,1,1,1,1]) x 100
Q diag( [1,1,1,1,1] )
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Figure 4. Trajectory associated with the longitudinal flight condition.
Figure 5. Relevant states for the longitudinal flight condition.
In Case A we consider a flight upset in the angle of attack, Δa (0) about
atrim = 2 . 20(deg) for the longitudinal flight condition. The dependency of
g on Δa(0) for both controllers is illustrated in Figure 8. The dashed lines
and the solid lines represent results from the baseline and adaptive controllers
respectively. A comparison of these curves shows that the non-failure region
of the adaptive controller is larger by virtue of the structural and tracking
performance requirements. The nominal parameter value is indicated as a
20
Figure 6. Trajectory associated with the lateral flight condition.
Figure 7. Relevant states for the lateral flight condition.
vertical yellow line. The line conventions used in this figure also apply to the
figures that follow.
In Case B we consider the movement of the CG in the x-direction for the
longitudinal flight condition. Recall that a positive value of the CG movement
denotes a forward movement. Figure 9 illustrates the dependency of g on the
CG location for both controllers. Note that the system loses stability when
the CG moves backward, while the tracking performance degrades the faster
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Figure 8. Case A: g (a(0)) for the longitudinal FC. Line convention: nomi-
nal parameter point (yellow), loading factor requirement (blue), steady-state
requirement (green), tracking performance (red), adaptive controller (solid),
baseline controller (dash-dot).
when the CG moves forward. The baseline controller has a PSM of 0 . 175 while
the adaptive one attains a PSM of 0 . 197.
In Case C we consider the movement of the CG in the y-direction for
the lateral flight condition. In this setting a positive CG movement denotes
movement to the right. Figure 10 illustrates the dependency of g on the CG
location for both controllers. The curves are asymmetric with respect to the
nominal parameter value, since the flight condition is itself asymmetric. As
before, the adaptive controller attains a larger PSM. The baseline controller
has a PSM of 0 . 0029 while the adaptive one attains a PSM of 0 . 0069.
In Case D, we consider a symmetric failure in both ailerons, where Aail =
Aa1 = Aa2 , for the lateral FC. Figure 11 illustrates the dependency of g on Aail
for both controllers. While the PSM for the baseline is 6 . 6%, the PSM for
the adaptive is 10%. In both cases, the tracking performance is the critical
requirement.
In Case E we consider a symmetric failure in both elevators, where Aele =
Ae1 = Ae2 , for the longitudinal FC. Figure 12 illustrates the dependency of
g on Aele for both controllers. While the PSM for the baseline is 33%, the
PSM for the adaptive is 42%. In both cases, the tracking performance is the
critical requirement. As before, the adaptive controller has better robustness
characteristics.
22
Figure 9. Case B: g(D,;/cT, f) for the longitudinal FC. Line convention: nom-
inal parameter point (yellow), loading factor requirement (blue), steady-state
requirement (green), tracking performance (red), adaptive controller (solid),
baseline controller (dash-dot).
Figure 10. Case C: g (Dy /bT, f) for the lateral FC. Line convention: nomi-
nal parameter point (yellow), loading factor requirement (blue), steady-state
requirement (green), tracking performance (red), adaptive controller (solid),
baseline controller (dash-dot).
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Unlike Case C, Case F considers an asymmetric aileron failure where Aa,,
is uncertain and Aa,2 = 1. Figure 13 illustrates the dependency of g on Aa,,
for both controllers. While the PSM for the baseline is 14%, the PSM for the
adaptive is 20%. Consistently, the tracking performance requirement remains
as a critical requirement. Note however, that the PSM corresponding to the
stability requirement for the adaptive controller becomes smaller.
Figure 11. Case D: g(Λa,Zl) for the lateral FC. Line convention: nominal pa-
rameter point (yellow), loading factor requirement (blue), steady-state require-
ment (green), tracking performance (red), adaptive controller (solid), baseline
controller (dash-dot).
In Case G we consider a failure in the left outboard engine At, for the
longitudinal FC. Figure 14 illustrates the dependency of g on At, for both con-
trollers. While the PSM for the baseline is 1 . 7%, the PSM for the adaptive is
2 . 9%. As before, the tracking performance is the critical requirement. Note
that the margins obtained in this case are considerably smaller than those
found in the other cases. The non-failure domains are small since the throttle
inputs are not controlled and remain fixed at their trim values. A time simula-
tion for a 40% loss in control effectiveness occuring 7s after the step input has
been commanded is shown in Figure 15. Note that this point belongs to the
C(.r ) corresponding to the adaptive controller and to the .r corresponding
to the baseline. Results similar to those in Figure 14 were observed when the
Lateral FC was used.
A lock-in-place failure in the left elevator is considered in Case H. This is
simulated by keeping this control input at a constant value for a period of tl
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Figure 12. Case E: g(A,,,) for the longitudinal FC. Line convention: nomi-
nal parameter point (yellow), loading factor requirement (blue), steady-state
requirement (green), tracking performance (red), adaptive controller (solid),
baseline controller (dash-dot).
Figure 13. Case F: g(λa,1) for the lateral FC. Line convention: nominal parame-
ter point (yellow), loading factor requirement (blue), steady-state requirement
(green), tracking performance (red), adaptive controller (solid), baseline con-
troller (dash-dot).
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Figure 14. Case G: g(Ati ) for the longitudinal FC. Line convention: nomi-
nal parameter point (yellow), loading factor requirement (blue), steady-state
requirement (green), tracking performance (red), adaptive controller (solid),
baseline controller (dash-dot).
1
adaptive
N	 0 5 — — — reference
^ — ' — ' nominal
0
-0.5
-1
0 10	 20	 30	 40 50	 60
0
-0.05
-0.1
0 10	 20	 30	 40 50	 60
0.2
N	 0
til
 -0.2
-0.4
-0.6
-0.8
0 10	 20	 30	 40 50	 60
Time
	 (sec)
0
-5
'E
.H
P' 
-10
-15
0	 10	 20	 30	 40	 50	 60
5
0
^
`! -5
.H
N
-10
-15
0	 10	 20	 30	 40	 50	 60
Time (sec)
Figure 15. Time simulation for A t, = 0.6.
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seconds. The larger the tl the most severe the failure, being oc the practical
case of interest. Figure 16 illustrates the dependency of g on the lock-in time.
Substantial differences in the functional dependencies are apparent. It can be
seen that the PSM for the baseline is 1 . 1 while the PSM for the adaptive is
2 . 1. Note also that while the tracking performance is critical for the baseline
controller, the stability requirement is critical for the adaptive one. Case I
Figure 16. Case H: g (tl) for the longitudinal FC. Line convention: nomi-
nal parameter point (yellow), loading factor requirement (blue), steady-state
requirement (green), tracking performance (red), adaptive controller (solid),
baseline controller (dash-dot).
considers the case when there is a time delay T in all three control inputs.
Figure 17 illustrates the dependency of g on this uncertain parameter for the
longitudinal flight condition. In contrast to all other cases, the non-failure
domain of the adaptive controller is smaller that that of the baseline. Hence,
the nominal controller is more robust to time delay than the adaptive one.
One may infer that this is the price of attaining improved system performance
through aggressive actuation. Note however, that this observation may not
hold when multiple uncertainties occur simultaneously. Figure 18 shows time
responses for both controllers when T = 0 .74s. This point belongs to the
non-failure domain of the baseline controller and to the failure domain of the
adaptive one.
Table 4 summarizes the results above by presenting the relative change in
PSM attained by the adaptive controller and the critical requirement. In all
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Figure 17. Case I: g (τ) for the longitudinal FC. Line convention: nominal pa-
rameter point (yellow), loading factor requirement (blue), steady-state require-
ment (green), tracking performance (red), adaptive controller (solid), baseline
controller (dash-dot).
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Table 4. Summary of results
Case ρadap — 1	 × 100%ρbase Critical Requirement
A +4.01 % 91 , 93
B +11.4% 92 , 93
C +133 % 92 , 93
D +63.6 % 93
E +27.3% 93
F +46.7% 93
G +70.6 % 93
H +88.9 % 92 , 93
I -13.9 % 92 , 93
but one of the cases cases, the adaptive controller attains better robustness by
a sizable margin.
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5.1 Multi-dimensional Case
In all the cases above a single uncertain parameter has been considered. In this
setting, the effect of the dependencies among parameters cannot be captured.
The same analysis can be conducted for a multi-dimensional vector p. In
such a case, multiple failures and uncertainties occur simultaneously and the
correlation among them may play a significant role. Studies of this type will
be presented in the future. However, Figure 19 presents a time simulation
of the controlled response for a multi-dimensional parameter realization when
2 pitch rate doublets are commanded. Therein, we assume loss in control
effectiveness of 30% for the elevators, 10% for the ailerons, and 10% for the
rudders. In addition, the CG has been moved to the left by 0.004b re f, and an
initial condition in the angle of attack of 0.2 degrees is assumed. It is apparent
that the adaptive controller achieves good tracking performance while the
nominal controller cannot recover and makes the system unstable.
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Figure 19. Time simulation for multiple uncertainties.
6 Conclusions
This paper presents an adaptive control architecture for safe flight of a trans-
port aircraft under adverse operating conditions and uncertainties. This archi-
tecture combines a nominal controller based on an LQR with integral action,
and an adaptive controller that accommodates actuator saturation and dis-
turbances. The resilience of both controllers to uncertainty is studied using
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a control verification methodology, where flight upsets, CG movements, and
actuator failures are considered individually. The results of this study show
that the adaptive controller enlarges the region of satisfactory performance
by sizable margins in all cases but one. This exception was observed in the
case of time-delay uncertainty, case for which the adaptive controller is less
robust than the baseline controller. A more accurate robustness assessment
will result from considering multiple uncertainties simultaneously. Such stud-
ies will indicate if the trends observed herein hold in a more realistic setting.
Since the adaptive controller was not designed specifically for the uncertain-
ties and closed-loop requirements used for its assessment, the improvements
in robustness observed are particularly remarkable.
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